

Handout 5 - Analytical solution of the Heckscher-Ohlin model

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1 Heckscher-Ohlin: analytical solution

Preferences Preferences for both $j = \{home, foreign\}$ are given by the following function

$$u(x_1^j, x_2^j) = \alpha \log x_1^j + (1 - \alpha) \log x_2^j$$

with the respective budget constraint

$$p_1 x_1^j + p_2 x_2^j = w^j L^j + r^j K^j$$

Technology The two final goods, $i = 1, 2$, in this economy are characterized by the following technology:

$$y_i^j = z_i (k_i^j)^{\beta_i} (l_i^j)^{1-\beta_i}$$

Endowments Without loss of generality let's assume that

$$K^h/L^h > K^f/L^f$$

that is, home is relatively abundant in capital.

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1.1 Autarky

Consumer maximization Consumers solve the following problem

$$\max_{x_1, x_2} \{ \alpha \log x_1 + (1 - \alpha) \log x_2, \text{ st } p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 = wL + rK \}$$

implying:

$$\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} = \frac{p_1 x_1}{p_2 x_2}$$

Firms minimization Firms minimize costs

$$\min_{l_i, k_i} \left\{ w l_i + r k_i, \text{ st } y_i \leq z_i (k_i)^{\beta_i} (l_i)^{1-\beta_i} \right\}$$

implying:

$$\frac{1 - \beta_i}{\beta_i} = \frac{w l_i}{r k_i} \tag{1}$$

Market clearing As usually $c_i = y_i$, and with (1) implies the following:

$$\begin{aligned} x_i &= y_i = z_i (k_i)^{\beta_i} (l_i)^{1-\beta_i} \\ \Rightarrow x_i &= z_i l_i \left(\frac{\beta_i}{1 - \beta_i} \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\beta_i} \end{aligned}$$

Because in equilibrium firms make zero profits, that is, $p_i z_i (k_i)^{\beta_i} (l_i)^{1-\beta_i} = w l_i + r k_i$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} p_i &= \frac{r k_i + w l_i}{z_i (k_i)^{\beta_i} (l_i)^{1-\beta_i}} \\ \Rightarrow p_i &= \frac{r k_i \frac{1}{\beta_i}}{z_i l_i \left(\frac{\beta_i}{1 - \beta_i} \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\beta_i}} \\ \Rightarrow p_i &= \frac{r k_i \frac{1}{\beta_i}}{z_i \frac{1-\beta_i}{\beta_i} \frac{r}{w} k_i \left(\frac{\beta_i}{1 - \beta_i} \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\beta_i}} \\ \Rightarrow p_i &= \frac{r^{\beta_i} w^{1-\beta_i}}{z_i (1 - \beta_i)^{1-\beta_i} \beta_i^{\beta_i}} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Using the foc for the consumer (λ is a Lagrangian multiplier):

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha &= \lambda p_1 x_1 \\ \Rightarrow \alpha &= \lambda (w l_1 + r k_1) \\ \Rightarrow \alpha &= \lambda \left(w l_1 + \frac{\beta_1}{1 - \beta_1} w l_1 \right) \\ \Rightarrow \alpha (1 - \beta_1) &= \lambda w l_1\end{aligned}$$

and, using similar calculations:

$$(1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta_2) = \lambda w l_2$$

So, dividing the ratio of the previous 2 equations gives:

$$\frac{l_1}{l_2} = \frac{\alpha (1 - \beta_1)}{(1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta_2)}$$

which together with the fact that $L = l_1 + l_2$ yields:

$$\begin{aligned}l_1 &= \frac{\alpha (1 - \beta_1)}{(1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta_2) + \alpha (1 - \beta_1)} L \\ l_2 &= \frac{(1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta_2)}{(1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta_2) + \alpha (1 - \beta_1)} L\end{aligned}\tag{3}$$

Using similar calculations for capital:

$$\begin{aligned}k_1 &= \frac{\alpha \beta_1}{(1 - \alpha) \beta_2 + \alpha \beta_1} K \\ k_2 &= \frac{(1 - \alpha) \beta_2}{(1 - \alpha) \beta_2 + \alpha \beta_1} K\end{aligned}\tag{4}$$

Dividing (3) on (4) and rearranging:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{l_1}{k_1} &= \frac{\frac{\alpha(1-\beta_1)}{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2)+\alpha(1-\beta_1)} L}{\frac{\alpha\beta_1}{(1-\alpha)\beta_2+\alpha\beta_1} K} \\
\Rightarrow \frac{1-\beta_1}{\beta_1} \frac{r}{w} &= \frac{\frac{\alpha(1-\beta_1)}{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2)+\alpha(1-\beta_1)} L}{\frac{\alpha\beta_1}{(1-\alpha)\beta_2+\alpha\beta_1} K} \\
\Rightarrow \frac{L}{K} &= \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2) + \alpha(1-\beta_1) r}{(1-\alpha)\beta_2 + \alpha\beta_1} \frac{r}{w} \tag{5}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, in a labor abundant country capital is relatively more expensive as we would expect. Finally, consumption is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
x_1 &= z_1 l_1 \left(\frac{\beta_1}{1-\beta_1} \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\beta_1} \\
\Rightarrow x_1 &= z_1 \frac{\alpha(1-\beta_1)}{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2) + \alpha(1-\beta_1)} L \left(\frac{\beta_1}{1-\beta_1} \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\beta_1} \\
\Rightarrow x_1 &= z_1 \frac{\alpha(1-\beta_1)}{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2) + \alpha(1-\beta_1)} L \left(\frac{\beta_1}{1-\beta_1} \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2) + \alpha(1-\beta_1) K}{(1-\alpha)\beta_2 + \alpha\beta_1} \frac{K}{L} \right)^{\beta_1} \\
\Rightarrow x_1 &= z_1 \frac{\alpha\beta_1^{\beta_1} (1-\beta_1)^{1-\beta_1}}{\left((1-\alpha)\beta_2 + \alpha\beta_1 \right)^{\beta_1} \left((1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2) + \alpha(1-\beta_1) \right)^{1-\beta_1}} L^{1-\beta_1} K^{\beta_1}
\end{aligned}$$

1.2 Free trade equilibrium

We'll stay in the case where both countries produce both goods. Note that now the goods market clearing conditions are the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
x_1^h + x_1^f &= y_1^h + y_1^f \\
x_2^h + x_2^f &= y_2^h + y_2^f
\end{aligned}$$

Firms maximization Firms maximize profits

$$\max_{l_i, k_i} \left\{ p_i z_i (k_i^j)^{\beta_i} (l_i^j)^{1-\beta_i} - w^j l_i^j - r^j k_i^j \right\}$$

implying:

$$w^j = (1-\beta_i) p_i z_i (k_i^j)^{\beta_i} (l_i^j)^{-\beta_i} \tag{6}$$

$$r^j = \beta_i p_i z_i (k_i^j)^{\beta_i-1} (l_i^j)^{1-\beta_i} \tag{7}$$

As in (2), zero profits also imply that:

$$p_i = \frac{(r^j)^{\beta_i} (w^j)^{1-\beta_i}}{z_i (1 - \beta_i)^{1-\beta_i} \beta_i^{\beta_i}}$$

Therefore

$$1 = \left(\frac{r^h}{r^f}\right)^{\beta_1} \left(\frac{w^h}{w^f}\right)^{1-\beta_1}$$

$$1 = \left(\frac{r^h}{r^f}\right)^{\beta_2} \left(\frac{w^h}{w^f}\right)^{1-\beta_2}$$

But this implies:

$$w^1 = w^2$$

$$r^1 = r^2$$

But this is just an implication of the **factor price equalization theorem (FPE)**!

Market clearing Now, rearranging (7):

$$r^j k_i^j = \beta_i p_i z_i (k_i^j)^{\beta_i} (l_i^j)^{1-\beta_i}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{r^j k_i^j}{\beta_i} = p_i y_i^j$$

$$\frac{w^j l_i^j}{1-\beta_i} = p_i y_i^j$$

And summing up over j together with FPE:

$$p_i (y_i^h + y_i^f) = \frac{r}{\beta_i} (k_i^h + k_i^f)$$

$$p_i (y_i^h + y_i^f) = \frac{w}{1 - \beta_i} (l_i^h + l_i^f)$$

Note that demand for goods 1 and market clearing implies:

$$\begin{aligned}
p_1 x_1^h &= \alpha (wL^h + rK^h) \\
\Rightarrow p_1 (x_1^h + x_1^f) &= \alpha (w(L^h + L^f) + r(K^h + K^f)) \\
\Rightarrow \frac{r}{\beta_1} (k_1^h + k_1^f) &= \alpha (w(L^h + L^f) + r(K^h + K^f)) \\
\Rightarrow r (k_1^h + k_1^f) &= \beta_1 \alpha (w(L^h + L^f) + r(K^h + K^f)) \tag{8}
\end{aligned}$$

and similarly

$$r (k_2^h + k_2^f) = \beta_2 (1 - \alpha) (w(L^h + L^f) + r(K^h + K^f)) \tag{9}$$

Summing up (8) and (9):

$$\begin{aligned}
r (k_2^h + k_2^f + k_1^h + k_1^f) &= (\beta_1 \alpha + \beta_2 (1 - \alpha)) (w(L^h + L^f) + r(K^h + K^f)) \\
\Rightarrow r (K^h + K^f) &= (\beta_1 \alpha + \beta_2 (1 - \alpha)) (w(L^h + L^f) + r(K^h + K^f)) \\
\Rightarrow r (K^h + K^f) (1 - \beta_1 \alpha - \beta_2 (1 - \alpha)) &= (\beta_1 \alpha + \beta_2 (1 - \alpha)) w(L^h + L^f) \\
\Rightarrow \frac{L^h + L^f}{K^h + K^f} &= \frac{r (1 - \beta_1 \alpha - \beta_2 (1 - \alpha))}{w (\beta_1 \alpha + \beta_2 (1 - \alpha))} \\
\Rightarrow \frac{L^h + L^f}{K^h + K^f} &= \frac{r (\alpha + (1 - \alpha) - \beta_1 \alpha - \beta_2 (1 - \alpha))}{w (\beta_1 \alpha + \beta_2 (1 - \alpha))} \\
\Rightarrow \frac{L^h + L^f}{K^h + K^f} &= \frac{r ((1 - \alpha) (1 - \beta_2) + \alpha (1 - \beta_1))}{w (\beta_2 (1 - \alpha) + \beta_1 \alpha)} \tag{10}
\end{aligned}$$

Comparing (10) with (5) and because we assume that $K^h/L^h > K^f/L^f$, one can see that r/w under free trade lies within the r/w that would prevail under autarky for both countries. This result could be predicted using both the **Stolper-Samuelson theorem** and the **Heckscher-Ohlin theorem**.

Now, from the factor demand equations and market clearing:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{w}{r} \frac{\beta_i}{(1-\beta_i)} l_i^j = k_i^j \\
\Rightarrow & \frac{w}{r} \left(\frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} l_1^j + \frac{\beta_2}{(1-\beta_2)} l_2^j \right) = k_2^j + k_1^j \\
\Rightarrow & \frac{w}{r} \left(\frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} (L^j - l_2^j) + \frac{\beta_2}{(1-\beta_2)} l_2^j \right) = K^j \\
\Rightarrow & \frac{w}{r} \left(\frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} L^j + \left(\frac{\beta_2}{(1-\beta_2)} - \frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} \right) l_2^j \right) = K^j \\
\Rightarrow & \frac{\beta_2 (1-\beta_1) - \beta_1 (1-\beta_2)}{(1-\beta_2)(1-\beta_1)} \frac{l_2^j}{L^j} = \frac{K^j}{L^j} \frac{r}{w} - \frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} \\
\Rightarrow & \frac{(1-\beta_2)(1-\beta_1)}{\beta_2 - \beta_1} \left(\frac{K^j}{L^j} \frac{r}{w} - \frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} \right) = \frac{l_2^j}{L^j}
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, substituting r/w gives:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{l_2^j}{L^j} &= \frac{(1-\beta_2)(1-\beta_1)}{\beta_2 - \beta_1} \left(\frac{K^j}{L^j} \frac{L^h + L^f}{K^h + K^f} \frac{\beta_2(1-\alpha) + \beta_1\alpha}{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2) + \alpha(1-\beta_1)} - \frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} \right) \\
\Rightarrow \frac{l_2^j}{L^j} &= \frac{(1-\beta_2)(1-\beta_1)}{\beta_1 - \beta_2} \left(\frac{\beta_1}{(1-\beta_1)} - \frac{K^j}{L^j} \frac{L^h + L^f}{K^h + K^f} \frac{\beta_2(1-\alpha) + \beta_1\alpha}{(1-\alpha)(1-\beta_2) + \alpha(1-\beta_1)} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

Note that in order for the countries to be in a specialization cone, that is, produce both goods, it must be that $l_2^j/L^j > 0$. Also, suppose that $\beta_1 > \beta_2$, meaning that sector 2 is more intensive in labor. Then a country abundant in labor, uses relatively more labor in that sector - this could be predicted using the **Rybczynsky theorem!** Consumption is given using the foc:

$$\begin{aligned}
p_2 c_2^j &= (1-\alpha) (rK^j + wL^j) \\
\Rightarrow c_2^j &= (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{r}{p_2} K^j + \frac{w}{p_2} L^j \right)
\end{aligned}$$

The allocation is determined by substitution the equilibrium prices. The same applies to all the remaining variables.